I'm still not awake enough to engage with the last 7 paragraphs, but I still want to state for the record that simply referring to Rojava as "the Kurds" is a tad too simplistic, as there are many Arabs, Assyrians and even Syrian Turkmen (though they're really just a subset of the Turkish people) and Armenians amongst their ranks. Just like the other sides of the Syrian Civil War, there isn't a one-on-one correlation between side and ethnicity.
And about the being conflicted with the government: well, who do you think the YPG and their al-Sanadid and MFS allies initially revolted against? Granted, the government had already withdrawn much (albeit not all) of their forces in the north to fight rebels and salafi militias in the west of the country by that point, but still. And certain government garrisons managed to cling onto pockets in the north, mostly being at a ceasefire with the Syrian Northerners, though some smaller scale engagements did occur, most of which were indecisive, those that weren't were in the Northerners' favour. Of course, with the exception of the aforementioned pockets, fighting between the government and the North stopped being a thing, largely because the coalition of rebels and salafists conquered the Euphrates valley, driving a wedge between them. This wedge was soon replaced with a different one when ISIS started its (in hindsight, pretty brief) rise. And who were the first to hand ISIS significant defeats again? (Rhetorical question, don't answer.) That's why they attracted foreign support from capitalistic states, whether they were democracies or authoritarian states, that already supported either of the main sides of the civil war. This was actually an alliance of convenience, really, including with - yes, I'm not denying, and, in fact, mentioned it in the comment in which I mentioned contemporary examples of anarchist polities, and I'm mentioning it again now - the Syrian government. Some anarchists and leftists have, sadly, seen this move as Rojava being a puppet to the west, but rather than that being the case, it's just that Rojava js just being pragmatic in its diplomacy. I'm gonna skip right over the admittedly very important and very interesting stories of Rojava capturing the ISIS capital of Raqqa, Turkey and its allies invading Afrin, and Rojava and the Syrian government delivering the final coup de gras to ISIS, and go right to the crisis regarding the Turkish invasion of Rojava. Trump has basically greenlit the invasion to Erdoğan because he's an idiot who, nevertheless, has authoritarian tendencies (and if it's hard enough either having an authoritarian in power, or having an idiot in power, try having both simultaneously, and in a country with such a global outreach that its politics affect basically everything), agreeing to withdraw the small US expedition in Rojava southwards, opening the border-regions up for invasion. Rojava, of course, felt betrayed by that move, and, diplomacy-wise, are now turning to the Syrian government and Russia for aid. This, however, also means that many parts of northern Syria are now actually under join SDF/SAF occupation (SDF - Syrian Democratic Forces; SAF - Syrian Armed Forces), which, I dare say, is kinda unfortunate.
